AVIATION LAW-FEDERAL PREEMPTION-EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF
AIRSPAcE-Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318
F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
To millions of Americans who live near major airports and
are being driven frantic by the noise from jet engines, President
Johnson must seem the luckiest guy in the world. No planes,
propeller or jet, are permitted to fly over his home, and when
the boisterous world of air transportation intrudes on his private
or political life, he can silence the intruder with a commandas he did recently during Carl Sandburg services at the Lincoln
Memorial. The commercial airliners landing and taking off from
National Airport were interfering with outdoor eulogies and Johnson, not wanting his own speech interrupted, told a Secret Service
man to call the airport tower and have the planes temporarily rerouted. They were.'
Unfortunately, this simplistic solution to the problem of aircraft
noise is not so readily available to the ordinary taxpayer. Noise emission has developed into possibly the most formidable aviation related
problem of the seventies, and as such, looms as the greatest obstacle to
the future progress of air transportation.2 With the increasing number
of jet aircraft landing and departing in close proximity to surrounding
communities, a conflict has arisen between the desire of inhabitants
to enjoy quiet and the public need for an efficient national airport
system. Local governments have attempted to cope with this problem
by enacting ordinances or seeking injunctions in order to restrict the
flight of aircraft above their communities or to limit their right to
3
take off and land.
1 Sherrill, The Jet Noise is Getting Awful, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1968, § 6 (Magazine),
at 24.
2 For an in depth study of the legal aspects of aircraft noise, see Dygert, An Economic
Approach to Airport Noise, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 207 (1964); Harvey, Landowners' Rights
in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1313 (1958); Hill, Liability for
Aircraft Noise-The Aftermath of Causby and Griggs, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1964);
Nagel, The Causby Case and the Relation of Landowners and Aviators-A New Theory
for the Protection of the Landowner, 14 J. AIR L. & COM. 112 (1947); Roth, Sonic Boom: A
New Legal Problem, 44 A.B.A.J. 216 (1958); Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports,
32 J. AIR L. & COM. 387 (1966); Comment, Federal Liability for Sonic Boom Damage, 31 S.
CAL. L. REV. 259 (1958).
3 American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, 297 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Ky. 1968),
aft'd, 407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969); American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F.
Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017
(1969); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955),
aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956); Stagg v. City of Santa Monica, 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82
Cal. Rptr. 578, 11 Av. Cas. 17,404 (Ct. App. 1969); Township of Hanover v. Town of
Morristown, 108 N.J. Super. 461, 261 A.2d 692, 11 Av. Cas. 17,436 (Ch. 1969).

NOTES

In Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank,4 the validity
of just such an ordinance, prohibiting jet takeoffs between the hours
of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., was contested. The city council of Burbank, California was attempting to regulate noise generating from
nearby Hollywood-Burbank Airport. An action was instituted by the
owner and operator of the airport and an intrastate carrier, seeking
an injunction and declaratory relief to invalidate the ordinance. The
federal district court, in a thoroughly analytical "memorandum opinion," held that the federal government has preempted the use of air
space and regulation of air traffic, thereby invalidating and precluding
enforcement of the local ordinance. 5 The court pinpointed the tests,
set forth by the Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,6
that must be applied to determine whether the federal government
intended to preempt a field:
So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. . . . Such a
purpose may be evidenced in several ways. (1) The scheme of federal
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. . . . (2)
Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest
is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject. . . . Likewise, the
object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character
of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. . . . (3)
Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the
objective of the federal statute. . . . It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice
of selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the
States undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations col7
lide.
The court felt that from the broad scope of federal statutes and
regulations, "Congress intended to centralize full and dominant control of the navigable air space in the Federal Government so as to
'8
provide for its safe and most efficient use."
To properly evaluate this decision it is necessary to briefly examine the statutes and regulations governing air traffic and the use of
airspace. The broad congressional policy for air transportation is
4

318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

5 Id. at 925.

6 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
7 318 F. Supp. at 922-23.
8 Id. at 925 (emphasis added).
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manifested by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 9 which states that
"[t]here is recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of
the United States a public right of freedom of transit through the
navigable airspace of the United States."' 0 The Act authorizes and
directs the Federal Aviation Administrator
to develop plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use
of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order
the use of the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and
limitations as he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety
of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace."
The Act confers upon the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA),12 and its Administrator, broad powers to regulate air commerce
in the "public interest."' 1 To effectuate this mandate, the Administrator is authorized to develop plans and formulate policy with
respect to the use of "navigable airspace," which is defined as that
airspace "above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations issued under this chapter, and [including that] airspace needed
1 4
The Administrato insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft."'
tor is empowered to allot the use of such airspace as he deems
proper;' 5 prescribe rules governing the flight of aircraft;' 6 promote
air commerce by establishing and maintaining air navigation facilities;' 7 conduct tests and undertake research and development of
airplanes and airplane equipment;' 8 and prescribe certain types of
9 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1964). For a history of this statutory scheme, see Lindsey,
The Legislative Development of Civil Aviation, 1938-1958, 28 J. AiR L. & CoM. 18 (1961-62).
10 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964).
11 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
This key section is considered the "heart" of the Act. S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14-15 (1958).
12 The FAA was established by 49 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1964).
'3 49 U.S.C. § 1303 (1964).
14 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1964) (emphasis added). The minimum altitudes of flight
prescribed by regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1970), are as follows:
Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an
aircraft below the following altitudes:
(a) Anywhere. An altitude allowing, if a power unit fails, an emergency
landing without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface.
(b) Over congested areas. Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement, or over any open air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above
the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.
(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface,
except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In that case, the aircraft may
not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.
15 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1964).
16 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1964).
17 49 U.S.C. §§ 1303(d), 1348(b) (1964).
18 49 U.S.C. § 1353(b) (1964).
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equipment airplanes must utilize.' 9 In addition to these expressly
enumerated powers, the Administrator is given the general authority
to issue such orders, rules, and regulations as he deems necessary to
20
execute his duties and carry out the provisions of the Act.
One specific and relevant example of this general power is the
Administrator's authority to prescribe air traffic regulations "for the
protection of persons and property on the ground. ' 2 1 In 1968, Congress
expressly dealt with the problem of noise abatement by amending the
Act to require the Administrator to prescribe "such rules and regulations as he may find necessary to provide for the control and abate22
ment of aircraft noise."
This complete and dominant statutory and regulatory 23 scheme
served as the basis for the district court's finding that the FAA preempted the field of aircraft control within the "navigable airspace. '24
Prior to Lockheed, this scheme was the basis for several federal court
decisions holding that the federal government had preempted the field
of "air traffic control" and "flight patterns." In 1952, a municipal ordinance was enacted by the Village of Cedarhurst, Long Island, prohibiting flights over its territory at altitudes lower than one thousand feet.
The ordinance was designed to minimize the noise interference from a
nearby international airport by controlling the flight path of aircraft.
Federal air traffic regulations, however, required aircraft using the
airport to fly over the village at low altitudes, and the federal district
19 49 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1) (1964).
20 49 U.S.C. § 1354(a) (1964).
21 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1964).
22 49 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (Supp. V, 1970). The Senate Report on the new legislation
declared:
In this regard, we concur in the following views set forth by the Secretary [of
Transportation] in his letter to the committee of June 22, 1968:
The courts have held that the Federal Government presently preempts the
field of noise regulation insofar as it involves controlling the flight of aircraft.
Local noise control legislation limiting the permissible noise level of all overflying
aircraft has recently been struck down because it conflicted with Federal regulation of air traffic. American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226
(U.S.D.C., E.D., N.Y. 1966). The court said, at 231, "The legislation operates in an
area committed to Federal care, and noise limiting rules operating as do those
of the ordinance must come from a Federal source." H.R. 3400 would merely
expand the Federal Government's role in a field already preempted. It would not
change this preemption. State and local governments will remain unable to use
their police powers to control aircraft noise by regulating the flight of aircraft.
S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2693-94
(1968).
28 The regulations are set forth in 14 C.F.R. (1970).
24 318 F. Supp. at 925.
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court in Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst,25 found the
ordinance invalid, declaring:
[T]he legislative action by the Congress together with the regulations, adopted pursuant thereto, have regulated air traffic in the
navigable airspace in the interest of safety to such an extent as
to constitute preemption in that field .... The States ... are thus
precluded from enacting valid contrary or conflicting legislation. 26
Subsequently, in the case of American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of
Hempstead,27 an ordinance which regulated noise levels by denying
the lower airspace to aircraft and thereby closing the landing approaches and takeoff paths of a nearby airport was contested. The
federal district court, in invalidating the enactment, reached these
conclusions:
It would be difficult to visualize a more comprehensive scheme of
combined regulation, subsidization and operational participation28
than that which the Congress has provided in the field of aviation.
The federal regulation of air navigation and air traffic is so
complete that it leaves no room for such local legislation as the
29
Hempstead Ordinance.
Federal preemption of airspace management was also a basis of

decision in American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, Kentucky, 30 where the court invalidated an ordinance making it unlawful
to fly any aircraft over the corporate limits of the city at a height of
less than 750 feet. The court concluded that "[t]he statutes enacted
by the Congress clearly expressed an intent fully to preempt the field
of law and regulation of interstate and foreign air traffic." 3' 1

132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
Id. at 881. The Cedarhurst court, in determining that preemption existed, interpreted the provisions of the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act which were less comprehensive than
the provisions of the 1958 Act. Therefore, a rather cogent a fortiori argument can be
asserted that the intent to preempt would necessarily be implied under the successor law.
Prior to Cedarhurst, and contrary to it, courts ordered alterations in flight patterns
by prohibiting aircraft from flying below a certain height over the landowner's property,
Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co., 1928 U.S. Av. 42 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1923) or
from flying over it altogether, Mohican & Reena, Inc. v. Tobiasz, 1938 U.S. Av. 1 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1938), Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, Inc., 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645 (Ch.
1948). However, such decrees conflict with federal safety regulations, and thus appear to
be no longer valid.
27 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
28 272 F. Supp. at 232.
25

26

29

Id. at 233.

80 297 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Ky. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969).
81 297 F. Supp. at 212.
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Thus, in the Cedarhurst, Hempstead and Audubon Park cases,
the courts indicated that local control of "flight patterns" and "air
traffic control" was preempted by Congress and therefore invalid. The
Lockheed decision extended preemption to include "takeoffs," thereby
preventing local initiative from interfering with the express provisions
of the federal government controlling airspace for "safety and efficiency."
Two state courts have recently reached contrary conclusions, however. In Stagg v. City of Santa Monica,3 2 an ordinance restricting jet
aircraft takeoffs between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. was
held to be a valid exercise of the municipality's police power:
Article XI, section 11 of the California Constitution empowers cities
and counties to make and enforce "such local, police, sanitary and
other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." As above
pointed out, there is no specific state legislation on the subject of
noise abatement; the ordinance does not conflict with existing legislation in the general field of aviation; there has been no express

declaration of legislative intent which would preclude local regulations in the field, or any general plan or scheme which is so com33
prehensive that an intent to occupy the field may be implied.
The court dismissed the preemption argument, 4 relying upon the
reasoning in Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 33
where the California Supreme Court, although denying injunctive relief which would have restricted flight operations at a nearby airport,
stated:
[T]he supremacy clause precludes the enforcement of state law
which conflicts with federal law, e.g., we could not enjoin a pilot
from flying in the landing pattern that he was ordered to follow
by the control tower, and it is for this reason, not preemption,
36
that a state may not prohibit that which federal authority directs.
The Stagg court concluded that not all local action had been preempted
by federal regulation in the field of air transportation. However,
applying the Rice tests that preemption is a matter of legislative intent,3 7 it seems clear that enforcement of this local ordinance would
conflict with the purposes of federal legislation to insure the efficient
utilization38 of airspace, and is therefore unenforceable.
32
33
34
35

36
37
38

2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578, 11 Av. Cas. 17,404 (Ct. App. 1969).
Id. at 323, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 581, 11 Av. Cas. at 17,406 (emphasis added).
Id. at 320, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 579, 11 Av. Cas. at 17,405.
61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 9 Av. Cas. 17,156 (1964).
Id. at 592, 394 P.2d at 554, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 714, 9 Av. Cas. at 17,161.
See notes 6-7 supra, and accompanying text.
A significant example of FAA action to achieve the "efficient utilization" of air-
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Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, in
Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown,3 9 enjoined jet aircraft
operations between specified hours at Morristown Municipal Airport.
Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction forbidding certain planned
physical alterations and extensions of facilities at the Morristown Airport, or in the alternative, a direction of the court curtailing use and
operation of the airport. The court made clear that where certain
airport activities were in conflict with the ordinary and expected
comfortable environment of persons living and working near the airport, it would attempt to accommodate both the interest that the
public has in flight, and the conflicting public interest in a quiet
environment. 40 The court stated that it would not order a total cessation of flights, but would instead prohibit jet operations during speci41
fied hours, except in emergency situations.
The court noted that the federal commerce power does not deny
the states the power to act as long as state and federal action are consistent. 42 In determining whether a conflict existed, the court relied

upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,43 where a municipal smoke control ordinance which applied to a vessel operating in interstate commerce and powered by federally inspected and licensed boilers was
held valid. There the conflict was not evident, the Court felt, since
the purpose of the federal licensing system was to insure safety, while
the purpose of the municipal ordinance was to protect the health and
welfare of the community against excessive smoke.
The Morristown court, determining that there was no evident
space is provided by the "High Density Traffic Airports" rule contained in 14 C.F.R.
§§ 93.121-31 (1970). This rule assigns certain high density traffic airports a specific number
of reservations per hour which reflects the number of aircraft operations each of those
airports can bear without becoming unduly congested. Commenting on just this point, the
Lockheed court stated:
By way of comment on the regulations applying to . . . high density airports,
it is reported in [the] Federal Register . . . that the allocation of flights was to
provide relief from excessive delays, not to correct safety problems. [T]he FAA
Administrator says: "* * * the public interest in efficient, convenient, and economical air transportation requires more effective use of airport and airspace capacity.
The authority of the FAA to regulate aircraft operations to reduce congestion is
dear. The plenary authority conferred by the Federal Aviation Act to regulate
the flight of aircraft to assure the safe and efficient utilization of the navigable
airspace is well established by practice and judicial decision."
318 F. Supp. at 923.
39 108 N.J. Super. 461, 261 A.2d 692, 11 Av. Cas. 17,436 (Ch. 1969).
40 Id. at 486, 261 A.2d at 705, 11 Av. Cas. at 17,445.
41 Id. at 492, 261 A.2d at 708, 11 Av. Cas. at 17,448.
42 Id. at 476, 261 A.2d at 699, 11 Av. Cas. at 17,441.
48 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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conflict in the controversy before it, stated: "[W]here there is state action consistent with the avowed second purpose of F.A.A., suppression
of noise, a state court may act." 44 Applying the Rice tests, however, it
appears clear that an injunction restricting takeoffs and landings would
conflict with the purpose and intent of federal regulations to insure
the efficient utilization of airspace.
In addition to the statutory scheme mentioned earlier, and subsequent to the Morristown decision, the FAA issued a bulletin which
described noise abatement procedures to be incorporated at the Morristown Airport.45 The FAA has recently established the Office of Environmental Quality, which supplants the Office of Noise Abatement
in handling aviation, related environmental problems. This office will
develop policy in the areas of smoke emission, exhaust pollution, aircraft noise, aircraft waste and also apply, on a continuing basis, noise
reduction technology to both current and future aircraft. 46 Furthermore, a Senate report which concerned itself with the problems of
noise abatement stated:
The courts have held that the Federal Government presently
preempts the field of noise regulation insofar as it involves controlling the flight of aircraft. 47
Therefore, the complete and dominant statutory scheme, the legislative history, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto, all indicate
that Congress intended to centralize, for the purposes of safety and efficiency, absolute control of both airspace management and noise suppression in the Federal Aviation Administration. Curtailing the use
of "navigable airspace" to combat the problem of noise emission is
not the solution. The process of regulating noise by regulating flight
patterns, or ultimately by controlling the right of aircraft to take off
and land, is inherently an effort by local communities "to regulate
a consequence while disclaiming regulation of the cause." '48 The Lockheed opinion therefore represents the better reasoned interpretation
44 108 N.J. Super. at 478, 261 A.2d at 700, 11 Av. Cas. at 17,442.
45 FAA, Morristown Airport Traffic Control Tower Bulletin No. 70-1, Morristown Airport Noise Abatement Runway System and Procedures for Turbojet and Large Piston Aircraft (Oct. 21, 1970). The stated purpose is "[t]o describe the noise abatement runway system and procedures established for turbojet and large (maximum certificated takeoff weight
more than 12,500 pounds) piston type aircraft at Morristown Municipal Airport in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulations, FAR 91.87f and FAR 91.87g."
40 AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 20, 1971, at 97.

47 S.REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2693-94 (1968).
48 American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226, 235 (E.D.N.Y.
1967).
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needed to maintain a viable and effective system of national airspace
control. If change is necessary, then national action must be the
vehicle for that change, rather than attempts at local appeasement
by municipal ordinance or state courts.
Michel F. Baumeister

